








Canadians successfully reformed the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans 
in the 1990s. Now we must do the same for the rest of our Retirement
Income System. This paper offers both a vision and a plan to provide 
a decent post-work standard of living for the millions of Canadian
workers currently accumulating insufficient retirement savings.
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THE PENSION PAPERS“Even as Canadians seek to deal with the short-run problems of traditional DB
plans then, they need to develop new models that offer attractive ways to pool
resources and save for retirement, while mitigating not only financial risk and
longevity risk, but agency risk as well.”
David Laidler
William Robson
This Commentary is a logical sequel to last year’s inaugural paper in the C.D.
Howe Institute’s Pension Paper Series. As cited above, Mssrs. Laidler and Robson
issued a challenge for Canadians in Ill-Defined Benefits: the Uncertain Present and
Brighter Future of Employee Pensions in Canada. I do indeed develop a new
pension model for Canadians to think about the context and dynamics of
generating adequate, affordable post-work income in the 21st century. The model
has three critical elements:
1. A retirement savings accumulation/decumulation formula likely to generate
adequate, affordable post-work lifetime payment streams.
2. Complete workforce coverage and job-to-job portability across Canada.
3. Pension delivery institutions that are transparent and cost-effective, and operate
solely in the best interests of the people they are meant to serve.
The new pension model addresses two major shortcomings in workplace pension
plans and individual retirement savings. First, an estimated 3.5 million Canadian
workers are not members of a workplace pension plan, and are not accumulating
sufficient retirement savings to maintain a decent post-work standard of living. The
second shortcoming relates to the 5.5 million Canadian households who currently
have their retirement assets invested in retail products with high sales and manage-
ment costs, which make it difficult for many of these 5.5 million households to
generate adequate pension income at affordable retirement saving rates. 
To address these flaws, the paper offers the Canada Supplementary Pension Plan
(CSPP) as a solution that is both theoretically sound, and practically feasible.
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I
n an ideal world, Canadians
should be able to provide for their
needs for food, clothing, shelter
and other goods and services equally
well before, during and after their
working lives. In the typical
individual life cycle, this means
getting an education, entering the
workforce and earning income,
buying a house and raising children,
saving for retirement, and then
drawing down those savings during
retirement. 
Current public policies help Canadians to shift
resources from the working to non-working phases
of their lives. For example, we spend public funds
on education, and we sponsor public
unemployment and disability insurance schemes.
We also design public retirement income systems
and income tax-deferment systems to help
Canadians maintain a decent standard of living
after they retire.
This section of the paper discusses what an ideal
retirement income system should look like. Over
the last few decades, applied economic theory,
empirical research, and emerging global “best
practices” have taught us much about what the
characteristics of the ideal system are. Three
features stand out: 
1. Retirement saving/consumption formulas that
provide a predictable, adequate standard of living
over complete post-work life spans.
2. Full participation by all citizens in such pension
arrangements.
3. Cost-effective pension delivery institutions that
operate first and foremost in the interests of the
people they are meant to serve.
To spread the load and diversify risks, responsi-
bility for provision of retirement income is ideally
shared between public and private actors in three
‘Pillars’. In Canada, Pillar 1 is usually defined as
the universal element operated by the state (i.e.,
GIS/OAS), funded through general tax revenues.
Pillar 2 provides workplace-based pension
coverage for all workers (i.e., CPP/QPP), funded
through payroll deductions and investment reserve
funds managed by the CPP Investment Board and
by the Caisse de Dépôt et Placements du Québec.
Pillar 3 – private retirement saving – are work-
place pension plans (i.e., RPPs) and individual
retirement saving plans (i.e., RRSPs). Pillar 3
arrangements supplement Pillar 1 and 2 schemes
and ideally raise retirement income to adequate
levels. A current adequacy rule of thumb is that
Pillar 1 and 2 arrangements should replace 30-40
percent of working income at the national median
wage. Pillar 3 arrangements should lift the total
income replacement rate to a range between 
50-70 percent with no ceiling.
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The ‘Life-Cycle’ Model of Consumption   
Among the most important financial questions
people face in their lifetimes are these three:
1. How much should I save for retirement?
2. What risks should I insure against?
3. How should I invest what I save?
Simple questions; complex answers. The life-cycle
model of consumption provides a logical,
structured way to address them while exposing the
complexities that lurk behind. Conceptually, the
model divides people’s lives into three phases:
youth, working/earning years, and retirement.
Figure 1 shows the general idea, with real
earnings, consumption, and saving rising during
working years. At age 65, earnings cease, saving
becomes dis-saving, and consumption continues.
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Thanks to Keith Horner, Jean-Claude Ménard, and members of the C.D. Howe Institute Pension Papers Advisory Panel, particularly Malcolm
Hamilton and James Pierlot, for reviewing drafts of this paper. Responsibility for remaining errors and omissions are the author’s alone.
1 There is an ongoing debate about what the 'ideal' final earnings replacement rate is after retirement. We place it in the 50-70 percent range,
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Key insights revealed by this simplified model are:
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￿ The focus of financial planning should be to
smooth people’s life-time standard of living, not
merely to accumulate financial assets.
￿ Financial assets and instruments can be used to
shift consumption from working to non-working
life phases. 
￿ Income should be saved when it exceeds the
amount required to maintain sustainable living
standards.
￿ People should be able to buy reasonably priced
insurance against undesirable events such as ill-
health, unemployment, inflation, and outliving
retirement savings.
￿ Tolerance for risk varies with the individual and
usually decreases with age – younger people have
longer to recover from financial setbacks and 
have less financial capital at risk. 
An ideal retirement income system is one in which
life-cycle financial plans will, for the majority, be
created, implemented and dynamically adjusted to
respond to each of these insights – a highly complex
business that is too complex for most people to
execute well on their own. A growing body of
behavioural finance research confirms that most of 
us aren’t good at personal financial planning and
demonstrate behaviour that is at times
overconfident, hesitant, inconsistent, and even
irrational.
3 We save too little or too late; we take on
too much or too little investment risk; we choose
investments poorly and fail to monitor their
performance; we pay too much to have our
investments managed; we fail to insure against
high-probability events such as market corrections
and outliving our savings. 
The implication is that for most participants, an
ideal retirement income system automates key life-
cycle financial decisions, starting at the end of the
cycle and working back to the front. So for
example, a Pillar 3 pension plan might set a final
earnings income replacement target of 60 percent
including Pillar 1 and 2 benefits. The plan would
make realistic assumptions about the length of the
participant’s prime earning years, return on
C.D. Howe Institute
2 Life-cycle finance deals with work/leisure opportunities and consumer choice over the entire lifespan. See Bodie (2007) for a full exposition.
3 There is now a rich literature on 'behavioral finance' and its implications for pension plan design. See, for example, Thaler and Sunstein




















Figure 1:  A Typical Life-Cycle Income/Consumption Pattern in Real Terms
Source: Author’s Calculations.Commentary 265 | 3
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4 Other assumptions include a starting 4 percent real return on contributions for the first 20 years, scaling down to 3 percent over the next 20
years, and remaining at 3 percent over the 20-year decumulation period, assuming that 50 percent of the accumulating pension account will
eventually be annuitized. 
5 See Ambachtsheer (2007), Chapter 4 for a longer exposition.
6 See Ambachtsheer and Bauer (2007) and Bauer et al. (2007). 
7 See Ambachtsheer, Capelle and Lum (2007).
8 CEM Benchmarking Inc. is a Toronto-based firm providing a range of performance benchmarking services to leading pension funds in
Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim.
9 Mutual fund fees have been under some pricing pressure recently. See for example Jonathan Chevreau's (2007) article “Sky-high fund fees
finally slipping,”
retirement savings, longevity, and then calculate the
saving rate (e.g., 6 percent of pay) required to hit
the 60 percent earnings replacement target. Reality
checks along the life-cycle path test whether course
adjustments (i.e. changes to contribution rates,
investment policy, retirement date) are required. As
the destination approaches, annuity contracts
purchased along the way insure against investment
volatility and longevity risk. An important caveat:
while probably best for most, the “autopilot”
formula may not be best for all. This means
allowing those who don’t want to be on the
autopilot path to opt out. 
As a concrete example of an autopilot mechanism,
consider a Canadian two-person household with
starting and projected final inflation-adjusted
employment earnings of $35,000 and $65,000,
respectively. So in this case, the target pension at age
65 is an inflation-indexed $39,000 (i.e., 60 percent
of $65,000). Assume that $25,000 is projected to
come from CPP/OAS, leaving $14,000 to be
provided by a Pillar 3 pension plan. Under
reasonable assumptions, this can be financed with a
contribution rate of 6 percent of earnings over 40
years.
4 As noted above, reality checks along the life-
cycle path test whether course corrections are
required during the journey. Ideally, all Canadians
travel on this type of financial life-cycle journey. 
Cost-Effective Pension Delivery Institutions     
Just as the life-cycle model of consumption suggests
how we should design pension accumulation
/decumulation formulas, so integrative investment
theory suggests how we should design pension
delivery institutions to implement them. With
traditional investment theory as its foundation, this
new theory recognizes the economic importance of
incentives, agency issues, and governance quality.
5
Business philosopher Peter Drucker identified these
three success elements over 30 years ago in his book
on the political economy of pensions titled The
Unseen Revolution. However, it is only recently that
we have started to measure the actual costs of
misaligned interests (i.e., agency costs) and of
dysfunctional governance.
A recent study by Bauer et al. suggests that agency
costs (mainly management and sales-related fees)
relating to retirement savings, unless they are
rigorously controlled, run as high as 2 to 4 percent
of assets per annum. This was the measured net
return out-performance of pension funds over retail
mutual funds.
6 Separate studies by Ambachtsheer et
al. suggest that even without agency costs, the cost
of poor governance within pension delivery
institutions can still amount to 1 to 2 percent of
assets.
7 Scale is also important: investment returns in
large-scale pension plans (e.g., in the $50B-100B
range) exceed returns in small ones (e.g., under
$100M) by an average 1 percent per annum,
according to the CEM Benchmarking Inc. database.
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These studies point to a material difference in the
rate of saving required to achieve target retirement
incomes, depending on whether funds are managed
by arms-length, well-governed pension delivery
organizations with scale and hence low unit
operating costs, or whether they are channelled into
retail products with much higher cost structures.
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To underscore this point, let us return to the
example of a typical Canadian household that must
finance a $14,000 indexed pension through a Pillar
3 scheme. The contribution rate was 6 percent of
earnings based on a real return of 4 percent for the
first 20 years, scaling down to 3 percent over the
next 20 years (by reducing investment risk through
the systematic conversion of 50 percent of the| 4 Commentary 265
accumulated pension assets into deferred annuities)
and remaining at 3 percent for the 20 retirement
years. Research cited above suggests that an arms-
length, well-governed pension delivery organization
with scale can add 1 percent per annum to passive
financial market returns, lowering the required
contribution rate from 6 percent to 4.5 percent of
earnings.
10 With average lifetime annual earnings of
$50,000, this translates into a cumulative saving of
$30,000 in contributions. 
Left to its own devices to invest retirement savings
through retail products, the typical household,
according to research, will under-perform market
returns by at least 2 percent per annum (the cited
Bauer et al. study found a 2 to 4 percent under-
performance range). As a result, the contribution rate
required to produce the target pension jumps from 6
percent to at least 10 percent of earnings, increasing
lifetime contributions by at least $80,000 as compared
to the first scenario (6 percent contribution rate) and
at least $110,000 as compared to the second (4.5
percent contribution rate). These are very big numbers
for most Canadians, and they demonstrate that agency,
governance, and scale factors are not just theoretical
concerns. It is clear that careful design of the institu-
tions through which retirement savings are managed
and converted into pension payments is essential to
designing successful Pillar 3 pension arrangements. 
How well does Canada’s current retirement
income system stack up? That is the question we
turn to next.
Assessing Canada’s Retirement Income
System: Strengths and Weaknesses 
We start with brief reviews of Pillars 1, 2 and 3 of
Canada’s retirement income system, and assess
how well they are currently supporting the
retirement income needs of Canadians.
Pillars 1 and 2 – Public Pensions Are a Strength
Pillar 1 is composed of two pay-as-you-go
schemes funded from general tax revenue – the
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and Old
Age Security (OAS). For individuals aged 65, GIS
pays up to $7,608 annually and OAS $6,028 for
a combined maximum of $13,636. A steep
clawback rate reduces the GIS to zero when
income other than OAS is $15,240 or higher for
individuals ($20,112 for couples). OAS is clawed
back at a rate of 15 percent of income exceeding
$64,718, reducing to zero when income reaches
$104,903.
11 Pillar 2 is the Canada/Quebec
Pension Plans (CPP/QPP), paying a maximum
pension of $10,615 annually. With no other
income sources, an individual receiving maximum
benefits from Pillars 1 and 2 would receive an
inflation-adjusted retirement income of about
$19,000 at age 65. However, the average benefit
paid by CPP/QPP is about half of the maximum,
which means that a typical individual retiree who
relies only on public pension benefits today
receives about $16,000 annually. The equivalent
amount for a couple is about $27,500. 
These Pillars 1 and 2 facts point to one of the
strengths of the Canadian retirement income
system: Pillars 1 and 2 provide full coverage and
high income-replacement rates for low-income
Canadians. For example, using the 60 percent
income-replacement adequacy rule of thumb
developed above, the estimated $27,500 pension
income from combined Pillar 1 and 2 sources for
a Canadian couple (with no other income
sources) replaces about $46,000 in annual work
earnings for the couple. However, these
calculations also make clear that middle- and
higher-income Canadians will require additional
Pillar 3 pension income to maintain their pre-
retirement standard of living in retirement.   
Pillar 3 – Voluntary Private Retirement Saving
Arrangements
Whereas Pillar 1 is coverage is universal, and Pillar
2 participation is mandatory, Pillar 3 participation
is voluntary. Pillar 3 is composed of pension and
deferred profit sharing plans sponsored by 
C.D. Howe Institute
10 The calculation assumes the pension delivery organization can generate an average 1 percent excess return right across the risk spectrum.
This is consistent with empirical experience.
11 Rates at January 2008. See http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/isp/oas/tabrates/tabmain.shtml. Commentary 265 | 5
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12 Statistics Canada (2008b, p. 14) shows 49 percent of families having an employer-sponsored pension plan, 58 percent of families having an
RRSP, registered retirement income fund or other type of retail pension asset, and 71 percent having one or the other or both.
13 See Canadian Institute of Actuaries (2007). 
employers and unions, and registered retirement
saving plans (RRSPs). Contributions into these
arrangements are deducted from the taxable
income of the contributor; investment earnings
accrue tax-free; withdrawals are taxed as income.
Pension plans come in two types – defined benefit
(DB) and defined contribution (DC). Most
typically, DB plans promise a retirement benefit
determined by a formula that takes into account
service and earnings, or provides a flat benefit per
month of employment service. DC pension plans
and RRSPs are “capital accumulation plans”
(CAPs) that provide a lump sum to be drawn in
retirement or converted to an annuity. The recent
2008 Budget added tax-free saving accounts
(TFSAs) to the list of options. TFSAs is a CAP
that can be used by all Canadians 18 and over.
There is no upfront tax deduction, but subsequent
investment earnings and withdrawals are tax-free.
Pension regulations have established a number
of ceilings and floors. The contribution ceilings
are established through the federal Income Tax Act
and Income Tax Regulations which restrict the
amount and timing of contributions, the kinds of
income that can be deferred in a pension plan or
RRSP, who can contribute, and when retirement
income must commence to be paid in tax-
deferred plans. Floors are set through pension-
standards legislation, enacted by every Canadian
province (except PEI) and by the federal
government for federally regulated employees.
Whereas tax rules limit income deferral, pension-
standards rules are supposed to protect pension
plan members, primarily through vesting and
locking-in rules, creditor protection and
minimum-funding standards.
Weak Pension Coverage and Adequacy: 
A Pessimistic View
Statistics Canada has reported that in 2005, 9.4
million Canadian households (71 percent of the
total 13.3 million) had Pillar 3 savings in
workplace pension plans, RRSPs or RRIFs.
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However, in a study published in June 2007, the
Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) took a
closer look at post-work income adequacy in
Canada. The study concluded that only “about
one-third of Canadian households are currently
saving at levels that will generate sufficient
income to cover their non-discretionary expenses
in retirement.”
13 In other words, of the 9.4
million households with Pillar 3 savings, only 4.4
million (47 percent) were on the right “adequacy”
track. The CIA study defined two key current
income-earning groups as: modest income (about
$40,000) and higher income (about $80,000).
Table 1 provides key information about these two
groups, which may be summarized as follows:
￿ Participation in DB plans is well below 50 percent
in both income groups, and declining.
￿ Participation in other types of pension plans is
rising, but not fast enough to offset the DB
decline. Overall participation in workplace
pension arrangements in Canada is declining.
Table 1: Trends in Workplace Pension Plan
Membership and RRSP Contributions
Percent Participation
Income Level – Modest 1996 2000 2004
DB Plan 40 35 33
Other Plan 5 6 8
No Plan 55 59 59
RRSP Contribution 46 45 43
Income Level – Higher
DB Plan 49 47 43
Other Plan 7 9 10
No Plan 44 44 47
RRSP Contribution 81 79 77
Source: Canadian Institute of Actuaries. “Planning for Retirement: Are
Canadians Saving Enough?”| 6 Commentary 265
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14 See Horner (2007).
15 The rule originated with the observation by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) that 20 percent of Italians owned 80 percent of
all private property in Italy. This distributional asymmetry has since been discovered to be a very common phenomenon. 
￿ Less than half the population is contributing to 
an RRSP.
￿ The proportion of the population contributing to
an RRSP is also declining.
The information in Table 1 masks a number of
other relevant considerations:
￿ DB plan membership is predominant in the
public and quasi-public sectors – only 20 percent
of private sector workers are DB plan members. 
￿ Participation rates in pension plans and RRSPs
cannot be aggregated – many pension plan
members also make RRSP contributions. 
￿ About 70 percent of Canadians aged 65 and older
own their own home, with a median value of
$163K (88 percent had no mortgage).
The CIA study focused on the financial adequacy
of retirement preparation within the ‘modest’ and
‘higher’ income groups for those expected to stop
working in 2030. In all, the study looked at
adequacy for 72 different profile groups based on
income, one- or two-person household/earners,
pension plan membership, retirement age, and
home-ownership. Its key findings may be
summarized as follows:
￿ RRSPs and workplace pensions have little
relevance for low-income Canadians, as current
Pillar 1 and 2 arrangements will maintain income
at support-program levels in the post-work period.
￿ DB plan membership, combined with Pillar 1 and
2 payments, provides a powerful boost to post-
work income adequacy for Canadians in the
‘modest’ and ‘higher’ income categories. Home
equity can have a positive impact on post-work
income adequacy. However, real estate is illiquid
and property values fluctuate. There are different
viewpoints as to what impact the aging of the
boomer generation will have on future house
prices.
￿ While RRSPs are tax-effective vehicles for
accumulating retirement savings, most Canadians
will have difficulty accumulating sufficient savings
to achieve post-work income adequacy solely
through RRSPs.
￿ Given the current data and the CIA assumptions,
only one-third of Canadian households appear to
be saving enough from all sources (e.g. workplace
pensions, RRSPs, home equity), when combined
with Pillar 1 and 2 payments, to be able to meet
projected non-discretionary household expenses 
in 2030. 
Some observers have argued that the CIA study
paints a too gloomy ‘adequacy’ picture of
Canadian retirement savings by setting the
income adequacy bar too high for lower-to-
middle income Canadians. In other words, the
study assumes too high income-replacement rates
for these Canadians. A study by former
Department of Finance pension expert Keith
Horner has painted a rosier picture.
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Weak Pension Coverage and Adequacy: 
A Rosier View
Key to Horner’s conclusions is the disaggregation
of the Canadian workforce by pension plan
membership, income level, and employer size
(shown in Tables 2 and 3). Out of a 2004
workforce of almost 15 million people, 5.4
million (37 percent) were members of workplace
pension plans (RPPs), with most of them (4.9
million) working for large public- and private-
sector employers. It is reasonable to assume that
the 5.4 million RPP members will receive
adequate Pillar 3 pensions. Of the 9.5 million
non-RPP workers, 4.9 million earned under
$30,000. For the reasons set out above (i.e., high
income-replacement rates through Pillars 1 and
2), they are not prime candidates for Pillar 3
pension-plan participation. That leaves 4.6
million workers who could potentially benefit
from Pillar 3 pension-plan participation. What
about Pillar 3 retirement savings adequacy
through the RRSP route? The distribution of
RRSP assets appears to nicely follow the 80-20
Pareto Distribution rule,
15 with the top 20 percent
of Canadians in terms of net worth having a
median RRSP value of $111,100. The medianIncome Level  C/QPP Self-Employed RPP Non-RPP
($000) (thousands)
0 – 30 6,862 908 1,017 4,937
30 – 60 5,117 387 2,552 2,178
60 + 2,874 279 1,808 787
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values for the other four quintiles were $35,000,
$15,000, $6,000, and $0 respectively.
16 Reducing
the 4.6 million by 20 percent still leaves 
3.5 million Canadian workers (i.e., one-quarter of
the workforce, mainly middle-income, working
for smaller employers) as the primary group most
likely to be on an inadequate retirement saving
track. If Canadian small businesses continue to be
a major engine of new employment in Canada,
the documented problem of inadequate
retirement saving will continue to grow in the
coming years unless corrective steps are taken.
The specific 3.5 million number for Canadian
workers on an inadequate retirement saving track is
our own calculation.
17 Here is how Horner
summarizes his findings:
￿ In general, Canada’s retirement income system has
performed well. 
￿ While many Canadians are saving adequately,
there are important gaps.
￿ In the modest earnings range, 50 percent of
C/QPP contributors do not have RPP coverage,
and perhaps half of those are saving inadequately. 
￿ RPP coverage among private-sector males
continues to decline, while that for females has
plateaued. After a period of strong growth, RRSP
savings appear to be plateauing as well, with an
increasing share being devoted to pre-retirement
needs.
￿ In contrast to the low wage growth and high
investment returns of the last few decades, we may
now be facing a period of higher wage growth and
lower returns. This means it will take more saving
(or years working) to produce adequate pension in
the future.
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16 See Statistics Canada (2008a).
17 Our 3.5 million workers assertion cannot be rigorously proven. However, we believe it to be a reasonable deduction.
Table 2: C/QPP Contributors by Employment and RPP Coverage, 2004
Source: CRA Income Statistics, tables 3 and 12.
RPP RPP Non- RPP Coverage Distribution Distribution RPP
Employer size Employees Members Members Incidence RPP Members Non-Members
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1-49 4,349 118 4,232 2.7 2.1 53.8
50-99 1,127 121 1,006 10.8 2.1 12.8
100-499 2,069 546 1,523 26.4 9.6 19.4
500+ 5,988 4,885 1,103 81.6 86.2 14.0
Total 13,533 5,669 7,863 41.9 100.0 100.0
Table 3: RPP Coverage and Employer Size, 2005
Source: Cansim table 2810042 for employees and table 2800010 for RPP members.| 8 Commentary 265
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18 See Statistics Canada (2008a).
19 Thanks to Rotman School of Management's Dean Roger Martin for the Buchanan reference. See Buchanan(1969).
20 Auto-enrolment has proved to be a powerful pension policy tool. Research shows that the drop-out rate out of well-designed pension arrangements
with an auto-enrollment feature is low. See, for example, Benartzi and Thaler (2008) who cite drop-out rates well below 10 percent. For this reason,
auto-enrolment is a critical component of the current UK pension reform initiative. See UK Pensions Commission (2004) and (2005). 
Another Pillar 3 Weakness: 
High Investment Costs
The accumulation of $600 billion now invested
through RRSPs by 8 million Canadian
households raises one final important question:
how is this retirement savings pool invested?
According to Statistics Canada, the answer is two-
thirds of RRSP households (i.e., 5.5 million)
invest in mutual funds (mainly equity funds), and
one-third have GIC investments, with other types
of investments spread thinly among multiple
other categories.
18 As noted, research indicates that
the high costs associated with choice of
investment vehicle can have a material negative
impact on savings accumulation and hence
income replacement. 
Strengthening Canada’s Retirement
Income System: A Bold Proposal
This section addresses the question of what steps
Canada could take to deal with the identified
problems of under-saving and high investment costs.
Private Choices or Public Choices?
A prior question is whether any action should be
taken at all. After all, the estimated 3.5 million
under-saving Canadian workers are freely
choosing to do so. The 5.5 million Canadian
RRSP households investing in mutual funds are
also freely choosing to do so. Is this not all a
matter of private choice and caveat emptor?
Adam Smith answered this question centuries
ago. While his more famous Wealth of Nations
detailed the benefits of enlightened self-interest
and private choice in 1776, his less famous Theory
of Moral Sentiments had already set out the virtues
of public choice in certain matters of broad
public interest in 1759. James Buchanan won the
1986 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work that
distinguished between the respective merits of
private- and public-choice models. He concluded
that the private-choice model should always get
preference providing it produces acceptable
results. If it does not, move to the public-choice
model if it can be demonstrated that it will likely
produce better outcomes.
19
Using the Buchanan framework, Canada’s
current retirement income system already has
elements of both public and private choice in it.
Pillars 1 and 2 are public choice elements, while
Pillar 3 arrangements are based on private
choices. Our analysis thus far indicates that these
private choices are creating two unacceptable
outcomes. First, some 3.5 million under-saving
Canadian workers will likely face a materially
reduced standard of living if they stop working at
the normal retirement age of 65. Second, the high
fees being paid by investors in many retail
products could seriously hamper the efforts of
some 5.5 million Canadian households with
RRSP assets from achieving their retirement
saving goals. Is there a public choice alternative
that will likely produce better outcomes for these
people? That is the question we address next.     
The Canada Supplementary Pension Plan
(CSPP)
In short, the answer is that we believe the Canada
Supplementary Pension Plan (CSPP) would very
likely produce materially better pension outcomes
for millions of Canadian households. Its key
features follow directly from the ideal pension
model design principles set out earlier in this
paper. Readers should not take the key feature
descriptions below as definitive. Instead, the
intent is to help visualize plausible possibilities
requiring further detailed study:
￿ Automatic enrolment of all non-covered workers 
into the CSPP: to address the identified pension
coverage problem, all Canadian workers who are
not members of a workplace-based pension plan
are (subject to opt-out provisions described below)
automatically enrolled in the CSPP.
20 This impliesCommentary 265 | 9
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21 The double 'opt-out' approach places the emphasis on the libertarian half of libertarian paternalism. In the UK pension reform plan, only
workers will have the 'opt-out' option. Even if employers have an 'opt-out' option, we foresee most willing to match employee contributions
for employees participating in the CSPP. This assumption would have to be tested by surveying Canada's employer community.
22 Sufficient scale would be attained quickly. For example, 3 million Canadian workers contributing an average $3,000 per annum generates
an annual cash-flow of $9 billion even before any shift of existing RRSP monies to the CSPP.
23 The CPP Investment Board can serve as the prototype for executing this type of mandate. It can also serve as the prototype in terms of legal
and governance structure, and a strong requirement for transparency and regular communication with stakeholders.
a joint federal-provincial plan; however, separate
provincial initiatives are a feasible alternative. 
￿ Use the CPP/QPP payroll deduction mechanism:
to maximize simplicity and minimize costs,
contributions to the CSPP are collected using the
same mechanism used to deduct CPP/QPP
contributions. CSPP contributions are directed
into personal retirement saving accounts set up
for, and owned by, each CSPP participant.
￿ Operate within the existing tax and regulatory
regime for pensions: to further maximize
implementation simplicity, the CSPP would
operate within the current three Canadian
pension pillars and the current tax/regulatory
regime regarding pensions. So, for example, CSPP
contributions would be subject to the current
maximum tax deductibility rule of 18 percent of
earnings up to a maximum contribution of
$20,000. This implies $111,111 is the current
earnings ceiling to which the full 18 percent
deduction applies.
￿ Target a 60 percent post-work earnings replacement
rate: in principle, CSPP contributions should be
set so that a post-work 60 percent earnings
replacement rate becomes a realistic goal
(integrated with both OAS and CPP/QPP
benefits) for all working Canadians. 
￿ Set an earnings floor and ceiling for CSPP
deductions: the 60 percent replacement target
implies establishing an earnings floor below which
no automatic CSPP deductions are made. Given
Canada’s current Pillars 1 and 2, that floor might
be $30,000. At the other end, a simple ceiling for
automatic CSPP deductions might the current
$111,111 maximum earnings tax deferral ceiling.
￿ Set an automatic default CSPP contribution rate:
again, in the interest of implementation
simplicity, the automatic CSPP contribution rate
between $30,000 and $111,000 might be set at
10 percent of earnings. The CSPP contributions
of lower income earners (say in the $30,000 to
$45,000 tranche) could go to TFSA-type
accounts. Setting the optimal default contribution
rate will be one of the most challenging aspects of
setting up the CSPP. Higher saving rates now lead
to higher standards of living later, but at the cost
of a lower standard of living today.
￿ Provide an opt-out option: employers/employees
share the automatic default CSPP contribution
deductions equally. However, if a complete non-
compulsion philosophy is maintained, either or
both employers and employees can opt out of this
particular plan feature.
21
￿ Provide an opt-in option: employers/employees
who choose to opt out of the CSPP’s automatic
default contribution mechanism can still use the
CSPP infrastructure to accumulate retirement
savings in personal retirement saving accounts in
any manner they choose within the existing
tax/regulatory structure.
￿ Provide an RRSP assets transfer option: Canadians
also have the option to move their accumulated
RRSP assets into their CSPP personal retirement
saving account.
￿ CSPP operates at arms-length from government: the
CSPP operates as an arms-length, expert entity
similar to the CPP Investment Board. It has
sufficient scale to operate at low unit cost (e.g., 
at or even below 0.3 percent of assets/yr.).
22
￿ CSPP operates as an expert, high-performance
financial institution: the investment arm of the
CSPP has a mandate to manage a Risk-
Optimizing Portfolio (ROP) in which each
personal retirement saving account can
participate.
23 In a manner similar to current CPP
Investment Board investment policy, the ROP is a
broadly diversified global return-seeking portfolio.
The CSPP also manages a Hedging Portfolio
(HP) option for CSPP participants with low risk
tolerances who want to secure future pension
payments at minimum risk. The CSPP is obliged
to report investment results for the ROP and 
HP investment strategies, and progress towards
achieving individual target pensions, in an
understandable way to CSPP participants on a
regular basis.| 10 Commentary 265
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￿ CSPP offers a number of annuitization options:
prior to age 45, all contributions are automatically
invested in the ROP option. However, CSPP
participants can choose to divert any proportion
of their contributions into the HP option. At age
45, an “autopilot” deferred annuity purchase
mechanism is initiated for each CSPP participant,
with a target of annuitizing 50 percent of
accumulated participant assets at age 65. The
annuities are targeted to begin paying monthly
pensions at age 65. Participants have an option to
commence the deferred annuity purchase process
earlier or later than age 45, and pension payment
commencement earlier or later than age 65. They
can also opt out of the default annuity purchase
process and receive all retirement income in a
RRIF-style payment option.
24
￿ A “paternalistic libertarian” philosophy: to reiterate
again, any auto-enrolled Canadian worker or
employer who does not wish to be CSPP
participant in any way can opt out of the plan.
This paternalistic libertarian approach balances
the need millions of Canadians have to be part 
of a structured, cost-effective approach to accu-
mulating retirement savings on the one hand,
with the preferences of some Canadians to do 
this on their own, on the other.
I believe that a plan with these key features will
be welcomed by most of the almost 10 million
Canadian workers without Pillar 3 pension plan
membership, and especially by the 3.5 million
Canadians who I estimate to be under-saving.
25
The CSPP offers all Canadians a realistic chance
to achieve post-work income adequacy in a
transparent, fair, cost-effective, and portable
manner. In addition, the creation a of new arm’s-
length, expert pension delivery organization
would add importantly to Canada’s already-strong
financial intermediation and global investment
management capabilities. These capabilities will
help Canada maintain leadership in the 21st
century global quest to create new wealth within
the confines of a finite planet.
26
However, we should all be clear about the
implications of achieving this new pension vision
for Canada. The creation and implementation of
the CSPP cannot be left to private-choice market
forces alone, as the barriers to success would be
too formidable. As with CPP/QPP reforms of the
1990s, pro-active public choice intervention by
Canada’s federal and provincial governments is
required. Canada’s federal and provincial
governments must create the legal and
institutional structures required to make the
CSPP element of Pillar 3 pension reform as
successful now as the Pillar 2 CPP/QPP reform
process was 10 years ago. They could leave
Canadians no greater legacy. 
Pillar 3 Pension Reform in Other Times and
Other Places
It is a little-known fact that, prior to the
establishment of the CPP/QPP, the province of
Ontario seriously contemplated establishing a
mandatory workplace-based pension plan for all
Ontario workers. Indeed, draft legislation “on the
extension and improvement of pension plans and
the portability of their benefits” was announced
by Premier Leslie Frost on February 17, 1961.
27
However, these efforts were abandoned in favour
24 We leave the exact features of the 'auto-pilot' annuities open to further research and discussion. Also, the best way for managing the
proposed annuitization process will have to be determined. Likely, self-annuitization within the CSPP will be the most cost-effective way to
go. The US universities pension system TIAA-CREF has successfully managed on the basis of separate individual investment accounts (i.e.,
the CREF component) and a collective risk-pooling annuity balance sheet (i.e., the TIAA component) for decades. See a new paper by
Brown et al. (2008 ) on ambivalent worker attitudes towards annuitization. See also a new paper by Scott (2008 ) on 'longevity annuities'
which only insure old-age (e.g., post-85) longevity. 
25 Behavioural finance research explains why most Canadians do not have either the skills or the self-discipline required to generate an
adequate post-work income stream on their own. That does not mean, however, that they are not keenly interested in participating in a
process designed to achieve that outcome. Their strong support for the CPP/QPP reform measures taken in the 1990s are evidence of this.
Further, a recent survey by La Régie des Rentes du Québec found that 60 percent of workers without a pension plan preferred joining a
pension plan to higher wages. See Le Devoir (2008).
26 The CPP Investment Board has shown leadership in this regard by offering early support to the establishment of the UN Principles of
Responsible Investment.
27 See the First and Second Reports of the Ontario Committee on Portable Pensions (1961).Commentary 265 | 11
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of the subsequent establishment of the CPP/QPP.
In more modern times, the northern European
countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, and Iceland) have taken the lead in Pillar
3 pension reform, focusing especially on ensuring
full work-force coverage, adequacy, portability,
and cost-effectiveness. Australia instituted
mandatory participation in Pillar 3 pension
arrangements for the entire workforce in 1991. 
There are multi-employer and regional pension
plans in North America that already operate with
many of the proposed features of the CSPP. In the
USA for example, the Teachers’ Insurance &
Annuity Association (TIAA) was founded in 1918
by Andrew Carnegie to provide pensions for
university professors and other workers in the
higher education and research sectors. A personal
accounts element (College Retirement Equity
Fund or CREF) was added in 1952. Today TIAA-
CREF manages the pension arrangements for 3.5
million workers working for 15,000 employers in
the US higher education and research sectors.
Total assets are $450 billion. In Canada, on a
much smaller scale, Saskatchewan’s Cooperative
Superannuation Society Pension Plan (CSSPP)
was incorporated in 1939. Today the CSSPP has
32,000 active members and 5,800 pensioners,
managing $3 billion on their behalf at a total cost
of 0.15 percent of assets. Like TIAA-CREF, the
CSSPP has both personal accounts and self-
annuitization features. In addition, it also offers a
RRIF-type pension payment option. 
However, it is recent UK experience that most
closely parallels the current Canadian situation.
We already noted that the UK government
commissioned a detailed study of all pillars of the
UK retirement income system chaired by Lord
Turner.
28 The study’s key findings were:
￿ Under-saving for retirement: an estimated 7 million
workers in the UK are under-saving for their
retirement.
￿ Complexity: the UK has a complex pension system,
making it difficult for people to choose what
retirement provisions are best for them. This
difficulty is compounded by inertia and mistrust of
the UK financial services sector.
￿ Demographic and social change: longevity is up and
fertility is down, placing increasing pressure on
pension provision adequacy and affordability.
￿ Inadequate institutional arrangements: Specific groups
of people are not being adequately provided for (e.g.,
workers with moderate incomes working for small
firms).
The Turner Commission’s key recommendation to
deal with these issues was “the creation of a low-cost,
national, funded pension savings scheme into which
individuals would be automatically enrolled, but
with the right to opt out.” In May 2006, the UK
government unveiled draft legislation to implement
this recommendation. The Pensions Act of 2007
established an arms-length Personal Accounts
Delivery Authority charged with “providing expert
advice to the Government” to develop the practical
implementation of the new pensions policy. A newly
introduced Pensions Act “allows for the broadening
of the Authority’s mandate so that it can oversee the
establishment of the personal accounts scheme.” In a
third stage, the Authority “will hand over the day-to-
day running and strategic management of the
personal accounts scheme to a trustee corporation.”
In short, the UK is well-underway to implementing
its own version of what we call the CSPP in this
paper. 
An Action Agenda For Individual
Canadians, Collective Groups of
Canadians and Governments
This final section of this paper lays out an agenda
for the three key constituencies whose actions can
transform Canada’s retirement income system for
the benefit of all Canadian workers. 
￿ Individual Canadians who are not members of
good employer pension plans must make it clear
to their elected federal and provincial
representatives and to their employers that they
28 See UK Pensions Commission (2004) and(2005). 29 Federal-provincial consensus is the preferred route. However, the contemplated initiative by Ontario to establish its own Pillar 3 pension
plan in the 1960s, and the actual creation of the Quebec Pension Plan in that decade, suggest the CSPP concept could also be implemented
at the regional or provincial level.
30 Veteran journalist Bruce Little is writing a timely history of CPP/QPP reform and its lessons titled “Fixing the Future: how Canada's
usually fractious governments worked together to rescue the Canada Pension Plan.” Publication is expected in November 2008.
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care passionately about maintaining their
standards of living in retirement. Canadians must
understand that they all do not need to become
experts in life-cycle finance and investments to
achieve this goal. Instead, they should insist that
their elected representatives and employers play
informed, constructive roles in inserting the major
missing piece in Canada’s current system that
would deal with the inadequate coverage and
retirement saving problems millions of Canadians
currently face, and with the too-high
implementation costs faced by millions more.
That major missing piece is the Canada
Supplementary Pension Plan.
￿ Collective groups of Canadians (e.g., professional
groups, business groups, employers, organized
labour) must also play constructive roles in
improving Canada’s retirement income system.
These collectives can add their powerful voices to
those of individual Canadians, demanding that
the major faults in the Pillar 3 component of the
system be addressed. We hope that they will see a
vision in this paper around which they can join
forces.
￿ Governments must understand that the provision
of adequate, sustainable, affordable post-work
income streams is one of the great 21st century
challenges facing developed countries such as
Canada. Canada’s political leaders can take great
credit for successful CPP/QPP reforms, which
have left Canada in the enviable position of
having one of the most secure Pillar 1 and 2
schemes in the world. The time has now come to
reform Pillar 3. Just as federal and provincial
finance ministers and their officials sat down in
the mid-1990s to address the growing
sustainability and fairness problems of the
CPP/QPP, now they must sit down and do the
same for the failing elements of Canada’s Pillar 3
pension arrangements identified in this paper.
29
While substantive pension reform in the past has
always required strong federal-provincial
collaborative efforts, there is usually a champion.
Former Prime Minister Paul Martin deserves
considerable credit for driving the CPP/QPP
reforms of the 1990s forward to a successful
conclusion.
30 The critical question today is which
political leader (and political party) will pick up
the baton for the new round of pension reforms
that are now required.       
In conclusion, Canadians need a collective vision of
the retirement income system they want to sustain
them in the 21st century, and they need the outline
of a plan to turn that vision into reality. This paper
offers both. 
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